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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship b& 
tween probability and Spohn's theory for rep­
resentation of uncertain beliefs. Using the in­
tuitive idea that the more probable a propo­
sition is, the more believable it is, we study 
transformations from probability to Spoh­
nian disbelief and vice-versa. The transfor­
mations described in this paper are different 
from those described in the literature. In 
particular, the former satisfies the principles 
of ordinal congruence while the latter does 
not. Such transformations between proba­
bility and Spohn's calculi can contribute to 
( 1) a clarification of the semantics of non­
probabilistic degree of uncertain belief, and 
(2) to a construction of a decision theory for 
such calculi. In practice, the transformations 
will allow a meaningful combination of more 
than one calculus in different stages of using 
an expert system such as knowledge acquisi­
tion, inference, and interpretation of results. 
1 Introduction 
In [19, 20] Spohn describes a non-probabilistic theory 
for epistemic belief representation. One notable ad­
vantage of this theory compared to probability theory 
is in representing the notion of plain belief that is sup­
posed to be deductively closed. The deficiency of prob­
ability theory to do such a job has been demonstrated 
by the well-known Lottery Paradox that describes the 
situation in which each of a million lottery players has 
no practical chance to win the jackpot, nevertheless, 
one among them will surely win. Another nice feature 
of Spohn's theory is its naturally defined concept of 
conditionals which is similar to its probabilistic coun­
terpart in many aspects. Hunter [9] and Shenoy [13] 
exploit that structural similarity to implement Spohn's 
theory using computational architectures traditionally 
used for probability such as valuation networks and 
Bayesian networks. From a theoretical perspective, 
on one hand, Dubois and Prade [4] observe that the 
basic representation in Spohn's theory, the disbelief 
function, can be interpreted as the negative of the log­
arithm of a possibility function. On the other hand, 
interpretation of disbelief values as infinitesimal proba­
bilities makes Spohn's theory tightly related to Adams' 
study of E-semantics for default reasoning [1]. Thus, 
Spohn's theory is well positioned in the web of quan­
titative approaches to represent and reason about un­
certain beliefs. In the remainder of this section, we 
shall briefly review the theory and ask questions that 
motivate the study of Spohn's belief-probability trans­
formations. 
Let n denote a set of possible worlds. For simplicity, 
we assume n is finite , 1!21 = n. We use w (perhaps 
with subscripts) to denote a world, i.e. w E !2. 
A Spohnian disbelief function {j is defined as a mapping 
5: n -t z+ 
where z+ is set of non-negative integers. {j satisfies 
the following axiom: 
S1 min 5(w) = 0. 
wEn 
An extension of {j to the set of all nonempty subsets 
of n is defined as follows 
S2 5(A) = min 5(w) for all A<;:; n. 
wE A 
For A <;:; n and w E A, the conditional disbelief func­
tion 5(w1A) is defined as 
S3 5(wiA) = 5(w)- 5(A). 
It is easy to verify that {j ( w I A) is a disbelief function 
on the (contracted) state space A i.e., it satisfies Sl. 
Therefore, for any subset of A, axiom S2 can be ap­
plied to determine the disbelief value. Analogous to 
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probability theory, the conditional degree of disbelief 
for a set B satisfying B n A =I 0 is defined as 
S4 6(BIA) = min 6(w1A). 
wEAnB 
Given disbelief function 6, a Spohnian belief function 
/3: 2° --+ Z (where Z is the set of whole numbers) can 
be defined as follows 
/3(A) = { -6(A) if 6(A) .> 0 6 (-,A) otherwise. 
If one defines "proposition A is believed with degree 
m(> 0)" to mean /3(A) = m, then it is easy to show 
that the set of propositions believed with respect to a 
disbelief function is deductively closed. This desirable 
property supports the idea of using disbelief functions 
to represent epistemic beliefs. 
To see the similarity between Spohnian disbelief func­
tions and probability functions, let us list the proba­
bilistic counterparts for the axioms S1 through S4. A 
probability function on the set !1 is a mapping 
p: !1--+ [0, 1] 
that satisfies following axioms. 
P1 l':wE!'l p(w) = 1. 
An extension of the function p to the set of all subsets 
of !1 is defined as 
P2 p(A) = l':wEAp(w) for all A� !1. 
The conditional probability function given A is defined 
for wE A as 
P3 p(wiA) = *i\l 
and for B� !1 
P4 p(BIA) = l:wEBp(wiB). 
The pairwise similarity of Si and Pi is obvious. While 
a qualification w E A is used in the definition of con­
ditional disbelief function, for probability such quali­
fication seems unnecessary (for w f. A, p(wiA) = 0). 
However, if we follow the convention 6(wiA) = oo for 
w f. A, then even this difference disappears. 
Until now, we are satisfied with the suggestion that 
the value assigned to a proposition by a disbelief func­
tion somehow reflects the firmness or strength of (sub­
jective) belief in that proposition. Although Spohn 
in [19, 20] used the term "ordinal conditional func­
tion" instead of "disbelief function" (introduced by 
Shenoy [13]), he endorsed the usage of the latter term 
that bore an obvious intuitive semantic. For the task 
of constructing a philosophical theory about epistemic 
beliefs that Spohn clearly engaged in, such an infor­
mal interpretation of disbelief functions is obviously 
helpful for exposition but not required as an absolute 
necessity. Abstract constructs are often sufficient for 
that kind of purpose. However, for those who want to 
build (computer) applications, such interpretations are 
often too abstract to be useful. They have to answer 
questions such as how to extract a disbelief function 
from available evidence, data, and human expertise; 
how to justify the use of one uncertainty calculus over 
another (for representation of epistemic states) in a 
specific situation; how to interpret the results or how 
to make use of results in decision problems. We believe 
that these concerns of practitioners could be addressed 
by a further exploration on the relationship between 
Spohnian disbelief and probability functions. 
The first hint of such a relationship has originated from 
Spohn. He suggests that "A is disbelieved with degree 
i" ( 6(A) = i) is equivalent to "p(A) is of the same 
order as Ei" for some probability function p and any 
infinitesimal E. For the case of uncountable ordinals 
originally considered in [ 19, 20], this interpretation of­
fers an explanation for the minimization operation in 
the definition of disbelief value for a non-atomic propo­
sition and the substraction operation in the definition 
of conditionals. But for a practical situation of a finite 
state space as we assume here, the condition about the 
order comparison based on infinitesimals is not very 
informative even if infinitesimals can be operational­
ized as close to zero. This approximation, in fact, has 
been used in [2, 8] by Darwiche and Goldszmidt, and 
Henrion et a!. 
The operationalization of infinitesimals by close-to­
zero numbers creates another problem. That is, such 
transformations may lead to counter-intuitive conse­
quences. The intuition that is at risk is the mono­
tonicity of disbelief values relative to probability be­
cause a proposition of lower degree of disbelief is in­
tuitively conceived as having a higher probability. To 
clarify the point, let us look at the experimental re­
sults in [2, 8]. Using E-rule: "if Ek+I < p(A) :::; Ek 
then 6(A) = k" , the authors apply Spohn's theory 
and probability calculus with various close-to-zero val­
ues of E and for many instances of a car troubleshoot­
ing problem and then compare the fault orderings re­
sulting from these applications. Because of the men­
tioned intuition, it is desirable that the orderings of 
possible faults according to (descending) probabilities 
produced by probabilistic calculation and (ascending) 
disbelief degrees produced by Spohn's calculation are 
the same. However, the results of experiments show 
that those orderings do not always coincide. For an 
illustration, let us use the following simple example. 
Example: Suppose we have !1 = {WI, w2, Wg, w4} 
with a given probability distribution. Using E-rule, 
we have the following table. 
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w p 
WI 0.5185 
W2 0.2308 
W3 0.1538 
w4 0.0969 
6.=.2 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Now let A = { w2} and B = { W3, W4}, we have p(A) < 
p(B) or "A is less probable than B" but after trans­
formation withE =  0.2 we have 6(A) = 0 < 6(B) = 1 
or "A is less disbelieved than B". The main goal of 
this work is to find a remedy to this problem. 
Earlier in this section, we cited Hunter's and Shenoy's 
works showing that automated inference with disbe­
lief functions can be easily implemented using archi­
tectures developed for probabilistic inference, in fact, 
with simpler computation [7]. For example, Shenoy's 
valuation-based system framework can be used for 
probabilistic as well as non-probabilistic calculi such 
as possibility theory and Spohnian disbelief functions 
[13, 14, 15]. More striking is the fact that the ax­
ioms that allow local computation in valuations-based 
systems [17] are satisfied by possibility theory and 
Spohn's epistemic-belief theory. This observation al­
lows one to develop a expert system shell that offers 
a-la-carte calculi for reasoning under uncertainty [16]. 
But a problem remains. Although the system has a 
common computational engine for different calculi, it 
is still not a genuine combination of these calculi. The 
system requires a user to pre-select a calculus and then 
lets the user construct a knowledge base and interpret 
the results within that calculus. So, a transformation 
between probabilistic and non-probabilistic calculus 
that will enable a dynamic exchange inside the system 
is highly desirable. For example, using Spohn's notion 
of plain beliefs we can encode opinions expressed by 
experts who may feel reluctant to commit to exact nu­
merical probabilities required by Bayesian networks. 
Then, we can combine that kind of information with 
statistical data using probability, make inferences with 
the combined data, and interpret the results in the cal­
culus most convenient to users. 
2 From Probability to Spohnian 
Disbelief 
In this section, we shall consider the problem of 
finding transformations from probability functions to 
Spohnian disbelief functions. Using the relationship 
pointed out by Dubois and Prade [4] that a disbe­
lief function can be interpreted as a the negative of 
the logarithm of a possibility function, we can use this 
mapping to go from probability to possibility and vice­
versa. 
Denote by P the set of probability distributions over 
set n and .6. the set of Spohn's disbelief functions over 
the same set. We consider the transformation 
T:P-+.6. (1) 
As discussed in the previous section, it is difficult to 
explain the exact semantics of Spohnian disbeliefs. 
For example, how can one interpret the statement "a 
proposition A is disbelieved to degree n". But we do 
know that the values of a disbelief function are used to 
rank propositions. So, it is reasonable to suggest the 
following principle. 
Definition 1 (Principle of ordinal congruence I) 
Transformation T is said to satisfy the principle of 
ordinal congruence if 'ip E P and 'i A, B � n, if 
p(A) � p(B) then T(p)(A) :S T(p)(B). 
In plain language, the principle of ordinal congruence 
says that the more probable a proposition is, the less 
disbelievable it should be. This principle is similar to 
that used by Dubois et a!. and Delgado and Moral in 
considering consistent possibility to probability func­
tions [3, 6]. 
Note that the set of congruent transformations is not 
empty. A trivial transformation that matches every 
probability distribution in P to the vacuous disbelief 
function o is obviously a congruent transformation. 
The vacuous disbelief function o on 0 is defined as 
'iw E 0, o(w) = 0. 
Since the cardinality of [0, 1] - the range of a probabil­
ity function - is uncountable, IPI is also uncountable. 
Similarly, we know that 1.6.1 is countable because INI 
is countable. So, the transformation T is many-to-one. 
Comparing a probability distribution and its associ­
ated Spohn's disbelief function, notice that T is a 
"coarsening" process. For probability, it is possible 
that each subset of n has a distinct probability i.e. 2n 
subsets have 2n different values. As a simple exam­
ple, consider the probability distribution p such that 
p(w;) = 2-i .Z where i is the subscript of w;, an arbi­
trary labeling of the elements of n, and z is the nor­
malization constant. It is not difficult to show that 
for A, B � n if A =I B then p(A) =I p(B). For­
mally, if we define Cx = {A <:;:; Olp(A) = x }, then 
l{xiCx =/ 0}1 � n. We can show that the equality hap­
pens if and only if p(w) = � for all wE 0. In contrast, 
because of the minimization operation, it is evident 
that the number of levels a Spohn's disbelief function 
6 has on the set of subsets of n is less or equal to n. 
The equality happens only if the degrees of disbelief 
for singletons are all distinct. Therefore, a transfor­
mation from probability function to disbelief function 
will match each level of the latter to one or more levels 
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of the former. 
Intuitively, the larger the number of levels an uncer­
tainty measure has, the more informative it is. Obvi­
ously, o is the most coarse disbelief function. We for­
malize this intuition by a definition. Denote by IT(p) I 
the number of levels T(p) has on 2° i.e. l{xl3w E 
!1, T(p)(w) = x}l. 
Definition 2 Let T1 and T2 be two transformations. 
We say T2 is coarser than T1 if IT1(p)l � IT2(P)I for 
all pEP 
Because we want to use a measure of uncertain be­
lief to differentiate among propositions we shall set 
our goal to find a least-coarse congruent transforma­
tion. We need the following definition to give an upper 
bound for the number of levels produced by a congru­
ent transformation. 
Definition 3 {Leap indices) For a non-increasing 
sequence Q of numbers q1 2: q2 2: ... 2: qn, the leap 
index set Lq is defined as Lq = {ilqi > �J=i+l qj}. 
In this definition, n, the index of smallest element of 
Q, is not a leap index. Informally, an index will be 
included in the leap set if the "mass" associated with 
that index is (strictly) greater than sum of those as­
sociated with all following indices. In general, from 
a set of numbers {qi} we can arrange them in more 
than one non-increasing sequences. Therefore, we can 
have more than one leap index set. For example, if 
qi = qi then qi and qi can swap their positions in a non­
increasing sequence to obtain another non-increasing 
sequence. However, it is easy to show that the car­
dinality of Lq is independent of such rearrangement, 
and therefore, it is a characteristic for the set { qi}· We 
also note that the cardinality of a leap index set can 
range from 0 (for example in case qi = qi for different 
i,j) to l{qi}l- 1. 
Lemma 1 If T is a congruent transformation then 
I T(p)l :::; ILpl + 1. 
Proof: Let I LPI = m. Suppose to the contrary that 
I T(p)l > m + 1. Let ni = {wiT(p)(w) = i}. For 
i = 0, 1, . . .  , m, m+ 1 we have 114 I = ki > 0. For w E !1; 
and v E l1j, i < j, because T(p) is congruent, we have 
p(w) > p(v). So we can, first, to locally rearrange 
each ni in non-increasing order according to probabil­
ity. Then, concatenate m + 2 locally non-increasing 
sequences into one non-increasing sequence. In other 
words, we can have PI � P2 2: . . . 2: Pn such that 
{wili = 1, ... ko} =no, {wili = ko+l, ... ko+kl} = nl 
and so on, and k0 + k1 + ... + km+l = n. For each 
0:::; i:::; m+ 1, define Gi = {wilj > ko + k1 + .. . ki}· 
In other words, Gi represents the union of the sets 
ni for j > i. On one hand, by definition, we have 
T(p,)(Gi) = i + 1. On the other hand, T(p)(w,,) = i 
where Bi = ko + k1 + . . . ki. By congruence of T(p), we 
infer that 
p(w,J > p(Gi) = L p(wj)· 
j>Si 
That means the set { Si li = 0, ... , m} is a subset of a 
leap index set. Obviously, I { si li = 0, . . . , m} I = m + 1, 
but we have assumed ILpl = m. That contradicts the 
hypothesis IT(p)l > m + 1. • 
For a given probability distribution, we re-label the 
elements w such that p(w1) 2: p(w2) 2: . . .  2: p(wn)· 
Let Pi denote p(wi). 
Definition 4 (Function T) 
Input: A sequence of probabilities 
(p1,P2, · · · ,pn)· 
Output: A sequence of disbelief degrees 
(d1, d2, . . . , dn) · 
r=O % r is disbelief counter, initially equal 0. 
% M is remaining mass, initially equal 1. M=1 
for i = 1 to n 
end 
di = r % d; is disbelief degree of wi. 
M = M - Pi % Pi is probability of Wi. 
if Pi > M then r = r + 1 
In other words, this simple algorithm runs once 
through n in the descending order of probabilities. 
Initially, the most probable world ( w1) gets disbelief 
degree 0. Disbelief degree counter increases by one at 
each leap index. We have the following theorem. 
Theorem 1 The function T in Definition 4 is a 
least-coarse congruent probability to Spohnian disbelief 
transformation function. 
Proof: 
Congruence. Let A and B be singletons i.e. A= {wi} 
and B = {wj}. If p(wi) > p(wj), then by the assump­
tion of non-increasing of sequence (PI, p2, ... , Pn) we 
have i < j. By the definition of function T, variable r 
is non-decreasing with time, therefore we have di :::; di. 
Consider the case A and B are not necessarily single­
tons. If p(A) > p(B), we have to show that there is a 
world wE A such that for all v E B d(w):::; d(v). Sup­
pose the contrary, there is a world v E B such that for 
all wE A, d(v) < d(w). Let d(v) = r. By hypothesis 
A� {wld(w) 2: r + 1}. Therefore, 
p( {wld(w) 2: r + 1}) 2: p(A) 2: p(B) 2: p(v). (2) 
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But we have d(v) = r. Let M(i) denotes the value of 
variable M at step i. We can easily prove 
n 
M(i) = L Pi· 
j=i+1 
(3) 
If d(w;) = r and d(w;+l) = r + 1 then because (p;) is 
a non-decreasing sequence, we have 
p(v) 2 p(w;). (4) 
And by the definition of function T, 
n 
p(w;)>M(i)= L Pi=P({wid(w)2r+1}) (5) 
j=i+1 
But this equation in combination with (2) contradicts 
equation (4). 
Least coarse. It is straightforward to show that 
I T(p)l = jLpl + 1. By the lemma, we have for all con­
gruent transformations T', I T'(p)l :::; ILpl + 1. That 
means T defined is least coarse. • 
i P; M; 8; 8,=.2 
1 0.5185 0.4815 0 0 
2 0.2308 0.2507 1 0 
3 0.1538 0.0969 1 1 
4 0.0969 0 2 1 
In this table, the first two and the fifth columns are 
taken from the example in section 1. The third and 
fourth columns illustrate how the transformation al­
gorithm works. The difference between the fourth and 
the fifth columns tells the advatages of T transfor­
mation over those by E-rules. The former offers an 
order-preserving disbelief assignment while the latter 
does not always guarantee that. When both have such 
property, the former produces at least as many levels 
as the latter. 
3 From Spohnian Disbelief to 
Probability 
In this section, we shall consider the reverse problem, 
given a Spohnian disbelief function 8, how can we de­
fine an "equivalent" probability function. Such trans­
formations are called for if we are to make decision 
based on the ordinal information provided by disbe­
lief functions and also wish our decision making be 
immune from attacks of the Dutch book argument. 
Snow [18] studies a transformation from qualitative 
probability to ordinary (quantitative) probability for 
the same reason. In short, we shall consider functions 
Definition 5 (Principle of ordinal congruence II) 
We say tmnsformation S is congruent if and only if 
whenever 8(A) < 8(B), we have S(8)(A) > S(8)(B) 
for all 8 E A and A, B � !1. 
Notice that the strict inequality in 8(A) < 8(B) should 
not be replaced by the weaker inequality :::; as this will 
have an undesirable consequence. Take for example, 
two sets C and D such that C::) D and 8(C) = 8(D), 
the principle of congruence would require S(8)(C) = 
S(8)(D). That means S(8)(C- D) = 0, or in words, 
probability of all worlds in ( C - D) should be 0. 
Given a disbelief function 8, let s = max {8(w)iw E 
!1}, i.e., s equals the disbelief value of a least be­
lieved world according to 8. We can define s numbers 
(ko, k1, ... , k,), where k; = l{wj8(w) = i} j. In other 
words, we can summarize a Spohnian disbelief func­
tion by corresponding vector ( k0, k1, ... , k,). 
Now we want to ponder about the numerical restric­
tions that the principle of ordinal congruence imposes 
on probabilities possibly assigned to the worlds in n. 
Let !1; ={wE !1j8(w) = i} for 0:::; i :::; s and let Ps be 
the average probability of the worlds in !1,. We have 
p(!1,) = k,.p, by the addition rule of probability. For 
any Ws-1 E !18-t, the principle of congruence forces 
p(Ws-1) > p(!1,). Therefore, p(!1s-1) > ks-1·ks·Ps· 
For Ws-2 E n.-2, p(Ws-2) > p(!1,_t) + p(!1,). Thus, 
p(Os-2) > ks-2 (ks-1 + 1).k,.p8• We can continue to 
write similar inequalities for p(!1,_3), down to p(!1o). 
Now we sum those inequalities to get 
8 
LP(!1i) > (ko + 1).(k1 + 1) ... (ks-1 + 1).k,.p,. 
i=O 
Taking into account p(!1) = 1, we infer 
1 Ps < (ko + 1).(kt + 1) ... (ks-1 + 1).k, . 
Similarly, we have for 0 :::; i :::; s 
- 1 Pi< (ko + 1).(k1 + 1) ... (k;-1 + 1).ki · 
where Pi denotes the average probability of the worlds 
in !1;. 
Given that disbelief function 8 is the only relevant in­
formation in the construction of a probability func­
tion, the probabilities assigned to the worlds having 
the same disbelief values must be the same, and hence 
equal to their average. This leads to the following def­
inition. 
Definition 6 (S) If 8(w) = i then 
1 1 1 S(8)(w) = 
-ko 1.-k - ... -k - .Z + 1+1 i+1 (6) 
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where Z is the normalization constant. 
From Definition 6, it is evident that probabilities are 
assigned to the worlds asymmetrically in the sense that 
the probability value assigned to a world believed with 
degree i depends only on less disbelieved worlds (with 
disbelief values less than i) and not on those that are 
more disbelieved. 
The second observation is that if ko = k1 = ... k, = k 
then probability of a world disbelieved with degree i 
has a very convenient form P
i
= (k + 1)-i .z. In other 
words, if we assume an "uniform" distribution of dis­
belief i.e. IOol = lOti = . . . 10.1 = l!}L then probability 
and degree of disbelief are related through an expo­
nential (or logarithmic) law. 
The third and maybe the most interesting feature of 
transformation 8 is its sensitivity to just the ordinal in­
formation contained in a disbelief function. It is noted 
that there is an infinite number of disbelief functions 
that are equivalent in terms of ranking possible worlds 
because a disbelief degree can be any natural number. 
We can identify a "canonical" element of such a class 
by the following densification operator. 
Definition 7 (Densification) Disbelief function 61 
is called densified version of 6o (write 61 = D(6o)) 
if and only if 
(1) 61(w) :S 61(w') whenever 6o(w) ::; 6o(w') for all 
w,w' E 0, and 
(2) the set { 61 (w)} is a set of consecutive non-negative 
integers. 
Informally, if we view a disbelief function 6 as an ar­
rangement of the set of possible worlds into strata Oo, 
!11 and so on where 0; = {w E Ol6(w) = i} then, 
what densification does is removing the empty strata 
and then shifting down the higher ones. Clause (1) 
ensures that as far as the ordinal order among worlds 
is concerned, a disbelief function and its densified ver­
sion are equivalent. In terms of vector (ko, k1, ... , k,), 
a dense disbelief function is one that does not have 
any k; = 0. It is easy to see that we can not make 
8 change the probability assigned to the worlds in n 
by inserting a number of zero strata into a disbelief 
function. 
Now we will show that transformation 8 congruent. 
First, we need a simple lemma. 
Lemma 2 Let p = 8(6) and G; = {wl6(w) > i}. If 
6(w) = i then p(w) > p(G;). 
Proof: For i= s- l, we have Gs-1 = {wl6(w) = s} 
where For each w E G s-l we have 
1 1 1 
p(w)= -k .
-k 1 . .. -k 1.z o+1 t+ .+ 
Because IGs-tl = k., we have 
1 1 1 k, p(Gs-1) = --.--.... .Z ko + 1 k1 + 1 ks-1 + 1 k, + 1 
So, if 6(w) = s -1 then p(w) > p(Gs-1)· 
Similarly, by backward recursion, we can prove for all 
i, if 6(w) = i then p(w) > p(G;). • 
Theorem 2 The 8 defined above is a congruent Spoh­
nian disbelief to probability tmnsformation function. 
Proof: Suppose 6(C) < 6(D) where C and D are 
subsets of 0. Let 6(C) = i, by axiom S2, there is a 
wE C such that 6(w) = i. Since 6(D) > i, for all v E 
D, 6(v) > i. Let G; = {wl6(w) > i}, we have D <:;; G;. 
That means p(G;) 2 p(D) because p is probability 
function. Since w E C, p(C) 2 p(w). By lemma, 
p(w) > p(G;). So, p(C) > p(D). • 
From the proof of Lemma 2, we can verify that the 
replacement of a denominator (k; + 1) in the defini­
tion of 8 with a greater number would leave the trans­
formation congruent. Therefore, we can restore the 
exponential relationship between probability and dis­
belief degree, as suggested by Spohn, by choosing one 
denominator kmax where 
kmax = max k;. 
0:5i:5s 
Thus, another transformation T' can be defined such 
that for p' = T'(6) and 6(w) = i, 
p'(w) 
= (kma� + 1) 
i .Z (7) 
So, what is the difference between transformations 
given by equations (6) and (7)? and what is the ratio­
nale for choosing (6) over (7)? One answer is that the 
former gives less skewed distribution. To see that let 
us compare the ratios � and � where p = 8(6) Prw2T P'1W2) 
and p' = T'(6) and Wt,W2 En. It is easy to show 
Lemma 3 If 6(wt) > 6(w2) then 1'f"'!l > � P{W2) P'1W2) 
In a sense, transformation 8 describes a more cautious 
attitude by allocating to less believed possible worlds 
the maximal probability that is permitted by the prin­
ciple of congruence. 
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Although equation (6) gives a point-valued probability 
for a possible world disbelieved with degree i, in gen­
eral, for a (non-atomic) proposition disbelieved with 
degree i what we can infer from the transformation is 
a range of probabilities. We have the following. 
Corollary 1 Assuming transformation S, for a dis­
belief function 6 represented by vector (ko, k1, ... , k,), 
the following statements are equivalent 
(i) 6(A) = i for A � !1; 
( . ") 1 Z < (A) < 1 Z tt rr·. (k ·+1). - p rr·.-1 (k ·+1). J=O J 1=0 J 
Example: 
6; k; p; 
0 1 0.5000.Z - 0.5454 
1 2 0.1667.Z = 0.1818 
2 1 0.0833.Z = 0.0909 
where Z = 0.9167-1. 
While probability to disbelief function transformation 
is a coarsening process that trades preciseness for com­
putational simplicity, the reverse transformation gives 
the impression that it imposes unsupported precise­
ness. It is also evident that S is not the inverse of T 
i.e. in general we have S(T(p)) -:J p. In fact, because 
P and 6. are of different cardinalities, we should not 
expect to find such a inverse pair of transformations, 
nevertheless we have T(S(6)) = 6 provided 6 is dense. 
Because Spohn's definition of deterministic believabil­
ity (or acceptance) of a proposition by the (set the­
oretical) inclusion of possible world disbelieved with 
degree 0, another use of transformation S is in find­
ing the acceptance threshold with the property that 
the set of higher-than-threshold probability proposi­
tions is deductively closed. For example, a prob­
ability function transformed from disbelief function 
with vector (ko, k1, ... ) sets the acceptance threshold 
at k:'J-1. It is worth noting that while the Lottery 
Paradox establishes that there is no a priori threshold 
that guarantees deductive closure of the set of higher­
than-threshold probability propositions for all proba­
bility distributions, given the probability distribution 
as above, the threshold k:'j_ 1 establishes a cut point of 
acceptance if we insist that the acceptance relation be 
closed under logical conjunction. 
Example: 
ko Unnormalized threshold 
1 0.5000 
2 0.6667 
3 0.7500 
4 0.8000 
4 Transformations and Belief Revision 
Any calculus designed to deal with uncertain beliefs 
has to provide a rule for belief revision due to new 
information. Such a rule maps an epistemic state to 
another. Traditionally, for this purpose, Bayes' rule 
of probability conditioning or its variations are used. 
But conditioning is not the only rule of belief revi­
sion. Lewis [11] proposed an alternative rule called 
probability imaging. For Spohn's disbelief function, 
conditioning is defined by axiom 83. 
In the previous sections we proposed some transforma­
tions that allows one to shift from one calculus to an­
other, which hopefully, maintains the essence of infor­
mation. The shifting of calculi creates new problems. 
Once the same body of information can be represented 
by different functions and each of them has their own 
rule for revision in the face of new information, how 
can we ensure that those revised functions are con­
gruent? In other words, the proposed transformations 
would be less useful if they did not maintain some kind 
of consistency with respect to belief revision rules in 
the different calculi. We will show that they in fact 
do. 
Suppose originally we have disbelief function 6, and 
after observing evidence (in the form of a proposition) 
A, and applying Spohn's rule of conditioning we get 
6'. Further, suppose 6 was transformed to probability 
function p by S. Having observed A, we can condi­
tion p on the proposition and get p'. We will show 
that T(p') is almost the same as 6'. The result on con­
sistency of the transformation rules T and S can be 
summarized in the following scheme. 
Theorem 3 
T(S(6)(./A)) = D(6(./A)) 
Spohn's conditioning on A 
____ an_d_d_e _n _si _fi _ca_t _io _n _ D( 6( ./A)) 
s T 
p --------- p(.IA) Probabilistic conditioning on A 
Proof: Sketch of proof. 
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Assume in this proof w, w' E A. We have: o(wJA) S: 
o(w'JA) iff o(w) :::;; o(w') iff S(o)(w) :::;; S(o)(w') iff 
S(o)(wJA) :::;; S(o)(w'JA). The bi-directional inference 
chain is due by invoking, first, Spohn's conditioning 
definition, then the definition S and finally, the defini­
tion of probabilistic conditioning. 
So if o(wJA) = o(w'JA) then S(o)(wJA) = S(o)(w'JA). 
And from the later equality, by definition ofT, we have 
T(S(o)(wJA)) = T(S(o)(w'JA)). 
Now, to complete the proof we have to show 
that if o(wJA) < o(w'IA) then T(S(o)(wJA)) < 
T(S(o)(w'JA)). 
Let o(w) = i, so o(w') > i. Recall notation G; ={wE 
UJ6(w) > i}. Let 8(6) = p, by lemma 2, we have 
p(w) > p(G;). We can rewrite 
p(G;) = L p(w). 
6(w)>i 
Note that for those wE G; nA, p(wJA) = �fA:l and for 
w ¢ G;nA, p(wJA) = 0. Sofromp(w) > p(G;), we have 
:!:4\ > p(�(A)) or using notation of conditional proba­
bility p(wJA) > p(G;nAJA). This is the condition to in­
crease rank parameter in definition ofT. So, applying 
transformation T for probability function p(.JA), we 
shall have T(p(.JA)(w) < T(p(.JA)(x) for all x E G;nA. 
Because of assumptions o(w') > i and w' E A, we have 
w' E G; n A. Thus, T(p(.JA)(w) < T(p(.JA)(w'). • 
Similarly, we can prove a result similar to Theorem 
3 for the alternative method of probability updating, 
namely, Lewis' imaging. Lewis [11] motivated his for­
mulation of probabilistic imaging from the fact that 
conditional probabilities are not the same as proba­
bilities of conditionals except for trivial languages. To 
define an image of a probability function p on a propo­
sition A, one needs, in addition, a closeness relation 
among possible worlds. After observing A, the mass 
(probability) that p assigns to a world w ¢A is moved 
to the world(s) closest to w that is( are) in A. A disbe­
lief function readily provides a closeness relation. We 
can define the "distance" between two worlds w1, w2 
by Jo(w1) - 6(w2)J. That means, having observed A, 
the mass of a world excluded by that observation will 
distributed evenly to the remained worlds of its class. 
Then Theorem 3 stills holds if (.JA) is understood as 
imaging on A instead of conditioning on A. Proof of 
that fact is similar to the proof of Theorem 3. 
5 Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we describe two transformations from 
probability to Spohnian disbelief function and vice­
versa. In a departure from the widely used idea of re-
lating disbelief values to infinitesimal probabilities i.e., 
E-rule, we adopt the principle of ordinal congruence 
as the basis for the transformations. Transformation T 
from probability to Spohnian disbelief is obtained if we 
couple the principle of congruence with the principle 
of minimal information loss. Transformation S from 
disbelief to probability function satisfies, in addition 
to the principle of congruence, the cautious attitude 
by allocating to less believed possible worlds the max­
imal probability that is permitted by the principle of 
congruence. We show that this pair of transformations 
are consistent with respect to conditionalization. 
In the experimental works using E-rule as probability­
Spohnian disbelief transformations, a tension is how 
small should E be. On one hand, the results from 
[19, 20, 7] say that with an infinitesimal E, reasonings 
with probability and Spohnian disbelief are congruent. 
On the other hand, with E approaching 0, the transfor­
mation defined by E-rule becomes the trivial, i.e., any 
strictly positive probability is assigned disbelief degree 
zero. The experiments in [2, 8] are set up, partly, to 
examine the effect of E values on reasoning outcome. 
Unfortunately, the results of those experiments can not 
provide an unambiguous answer to that tension. In 
this paper, considering a transformation class broader 
than that defined by E-rule, we show that T is the 
best answer. 
The transformation from non-probabilistic calculi to 
probability helps to connect the theories that lack de­
cision methods with the rich body of Bayesian decision 
theory developed for probability. 
Another benefit of such a linkage is that it provides se­
mantics for the values of disbelief functions. For prob­
ability, we have the semantics of relative frequency and 
betting rates. A subjective interpretation of the stat& 
ment "probability of A is p" is the maximum price 
a risk neutral person would be willing pay to buy a 
lottery that pays $1.00 if A happens and nothing oth­
erwise. We do not know of any similar semantics for 
possibility values or Spohnian disbelief values. Indeed, 
Dubois and Prade [4, 5] take pains to explain that 
the information content of the numerical value of a 
possibility function is nothing but an ordinal ranking. 
Spohn [20] provides a link between his disbelief func­
tion and probability. But since this link is not formally 
stated, it cannot provide a useful semantic for values 
of disbelief functions via probabilistic semantics. 
An advantage of Spohn's epistemic belief theory is 
computational simplicity. The human mind may not 
be designed for probabilistic computation. Common 
sense reasoning may not be probabilistic in nature. 
These assertions are supported by a large number of 
empirical studies in decision making [10]. Spohn's the-
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ory was motivated partly from the notion of repre­
senting plain belief. On the other hand, a vast body 
of literature on the principle of maximization of ex­
pected utility suggested by von Neumann and Morgen­
stern [21] and Savage [12] tend to support the thesis 
that rational behavior is based on numerical probabil­
ities. So the transformations described in this paper 
offer a bridge between having plain beliefs and behav­
ing rationally. It also hints at the costs of rational 
behavior if one starts from plain beliefs. 
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